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On March 4, 1998, the Supreme Court again narrowed
standing to sue in environmental citizen suits, holding that the
plaintiff in Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment
had no standing under Article III to sue solely for past violations
of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of
1986 (EPCRA).2 The case has since been cited in numerous
federal opinions for the implications3 of this holding4 for standing
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* J.D. candidate, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall),
2000; M.A., M.Phil., Yale University, 1994; A.B., Duke University, 1990. I would like
to thank Judge William Fletcher, Professors John Dwyer and Peter Menell, and Mary
Ose, Suzanne Pyatt, Joshua Rider, and Michael Wall for their extremely useful
comments on earlier drafts of this Casenote. Discussions with Professor Paul
Mishkin were also tremendously helpful. Much of the analysis in this Casenote was
informed by discussions of standing in environmental citizen suits at the American
Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting in New Orleans, La., January 5-7. 1999,
and at the Public Interest Environmental Law Conference at the University of Oregon
Law School, March 3-5, 1999.
1. 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998) (Scalia, J.).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994); see also znfra notes 17-24 and
accompanying text.
3. Steel Company is viewed as the new statement of standing law, replacing
Lujan as the standard reference for standing doctrine n recent cases involving
standing. A number of these standing cases involve environmental law. See, e.g.,
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303, 306 (4th
Cir. 1998), cerL granted, 119 S. Ct. 1111 (1999); Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d
606, 613, 619 (5th Cir. 1998); National Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Williams, 146
F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1998); ONRC Action v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 150 F.3d
1132, 1140 (9th Cir. 1998); Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council, 148 F.3d 1231,
1254 (11th Cir. 1998); NRDC v. Pena, 147 F.3d 1012, 1022, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
Dubois v. USDA, 20 F. Supp. 2d 263, 266-68 (D.N.H. 1998); NRDC v. Southwest
Marine, 28 F. Supp. 2d 584, 585-86 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
4. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1020. The Court also found that the use of
"hypothetical Jurisdiction" by the federal courts is impermissible under Article III of
the Constitution. See id. at 1012-16. This view has been cited in a number of cases
as well. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26:709
doctrine. The Steel Company Court reiterated the familiar
tripartite standing test: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered
"injury-in-fact"; (2) the plaintiffs injury must be "fairly traceable"
to the actions of the defendant; and (3) the relief requested in the
suit must redress the plaintiffs injury.' Focusing on the third
prong, redressability, the Court held that civil penalties payable
to the U.S. Treasury cannot redress a citizen group's injury
caused by past violations of EPCRA when the plaintiff has not
alleged continuing or possible future violations.6
While Steel Company flows predictably from recent standing
jurisprudence,7 it only exacerbates existing problems with the
standing framework established over the last quarter century.
First, the decision itself needlessly complicates Article III
doctrine.8  The lower courts have had extensive trouble
determining the boundaries of the Steel Company holding.9
5. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 10 16-17 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555 (1992)).
6. See idL at 1018.
7. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571 (plurality opinion) (finding that plaintiffs
lacked standing because the relief requested had only an "entirely conjectural"
possibility of redressing plaintiffs' injury); Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 326-27
(1991) (suggesting in dicta that plaintiffs' challenge to only one of two laws causing
the alleged injury precluded remedy, as the other law would continue the alleged
harm).
8. In this Casenote, I do not discuss the merits of the tripartite test (Le.,
whether Article III should be read to require a plaintiff to show injury-in-fact,
causation, and redressability). Numerous cogent criticisms of standing doctrine
show that the three-part test lacks a historical basis, see, e.g., Raoul Berger,
Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J.
816, 827 (1969); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-
Government, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1418-25 (1988), and that it cloaks in technical
doctrine what are actually normative decisions about the proper scope of government
action, see generally William Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221
(1988).
9. Recent cases involving environmental citizen suits have extended Steel
Company almost indiscriminately to dismiss civil penalties under a variety of
environmental statutes. In its decision on a case argued the day after Steel Company
was decided, the Fourth Circuit summarily vacated (with little to no analysis) a
district court ruling in favor of the plaintiff environmental organization on the
grounds that the case was moot under Steel Company, even though the case involved
the Clean Water Act instead of EPCRA and involved substantially different facts than
those in Steel Company. See Laidlaw, 149 F.3d at 306-07; see also Dubois v. USDA,
20 F. Supp. 2d 263 (D.N.H. 1998) (same); San Francisco BayKeeper v. Cargill, No. 96-
02161 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 1998) (partial grant of summary judgment) (finding plaintiff
lacked standing to sue for civil penalties). In contrast, some of the lower courts have
read Steel Company extremely narrowly. See, e.g., NRDC v. Southwest Marine, 39 F.
Supp. 2d 1235, 1237-38 (S.D. Cal. 1999); San Francisco BayKeeper v. Vallejo
Sanitation and Flood Control District, No. CIV-S-96-1554, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2211 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 1. 1999); Local Envtl. Awareness Dev. Group v. Exide Corp., No.
CIV-96-3030, 1999 WL 124473 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 1999). The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Laidlaw in March 1999. 119 S. Ct. 1111.
1999] STEEL COMPANY
While new Supreme Court cases inevitably cause readjustment
in the lower courts, Steel Company has resulted in more than
readjustment.' 0
Second, the Steel Company Court overreaches its power in
the name of restraint. Since Allen v. Wright, the central purpose
of standing doctrine has been to limit the powers of the federal
courts. 1 In the same vein, the Court must avoid a constitutional
question if the case may be resolved without reaching the
Constitution. 2 The imperatives of these two doctrines conflict in
Steel Company. As Justice Stevens argues in his concurrence,
the majority in Steel Company avoided any inquiry into whether
Congress intended to create the cause of action pleaded by the
plaintiffs.' 3 If Congress did not intend to create such a cause of
10. The impending Supreme Court decision in Laidlaw should make clear
whether the Court approves of the broad interpretations of Steel Company made by
the lower courts.
11. 468 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1984) (O'Connor, J.); see also, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992) (Scalia, J.); Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J.); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (Burger, C.J.);
id. at 188-92 (Powell, J., concurring). Academic commentaries have also emphasized
the separation of powers aspect of standing doctrine. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., On
Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigations: Notes on the Jurisprudence of
Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 16 (1984); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881 (1983).
While I agree that Article III imposes separation of powers limits on the
judicial branch, I am unconvinced that standing doctrine provides a workable means
of observing those limits. Such questions are beyond the scope of this Casenote. I
instead ask whether Steel Company fulfills the separation of powers concerns that
the Court itself invokes to justify its decision. For one criticism of the connection
between standing doctrine and separation of powers, see Jonathan Poisner,
Environmental Values and Judicial Review after Lujan: Two Critiques of the Separation
of Powers Theory of Standing, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 335 (1991).
12. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring). Ashwander states that "if a case can be decided on either
of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of
statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter." Id. at
347.
13. Justice Stevens would have the Court dismiss the case because EPCRA does
not allow suits for past violations. The immediate criticism is, of course, that such a
dismissal would be on the merits and would forestall any possibility of suits for past
violations under EPCRA. On this argument, the Court would have exercised more
power by taking Justice Stevens' approach. Given the effect of Steel Company's
standing ruling on suits under numerous different environmental statutes and for
both past and ongoing violations, however, Justice Stevens' approach appears the
more restrained.
One can also argue that, had a majority of the Court decided to reach the
statutory question, it would have rejected Justice Stevens' analysis of the statute and
agreed with the Seventh Circuit's holding below that EPCRA did create a cause of
action for past violations. Presumably Justices O'Connor and Breyer would have
taken this approach to EPCRA because both reject the idea that the Court can never
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action, the Court need not reach the standing question; it can
dismiss under the statute. In addressing standing, the Court
advised Congress.' 4 As Justice Scalia himself points out in Steel
Company, advisory opinions have been "disapproved by this
Court from the beginning." 5 Thus, the Court's approach has the
same problems it tries to avoid, highlighting the "intricate
interrelat[ionshipl" 6  between the questions of statutory
jurisdiction and Article III standing.
In this Casenote, I first outline the procedural history of
Steel Company and the structure and content of the Court's
decision. I then argue that Steel Company is a decision with
unfortunate implications for environmental and constitutional
law. However, because plaintiffs must craft their litigation to
avoid or defeat motions to dismiss for lack of standing under
Steel Company, I conclude with some practical suggestions.
answer the merits before addressing jurisdiction as long as the same result obtains.
If so, the Court would presumably have gone on to address the issue of Article III
standing and would probably have reached the same conclusion it did here. As
discussed later, this Casenote is concerned with the path the Court took in reaching
its destination. Had the Court first asked whether Congress meant to confer a cause
of action on the plaintiff, found that it did, and then asked whether the plaintiff had
Article III standing, the result would be a non-advisory opinion. One could argue that
it is logically impossible to interpret a statute and then to find that the plaintiff has
no standing to have the statute interpreted. But if the standing inquiry would affect
numerous statutes (as this one has), it is preferable to avoid reaching that question
until one is certain it must be answered. See infra Part III.B.
14. Judge (then-Professor) Fletcher has argued that the Court's typical injury-in-
fact analysis disguises a normative assessment of whether a plaintiff should have the
right to sue, thus trumping legislative determinations of what constitutes injury. See
Fletcher, supra note 8, at 231. The Steel Company analysis of redressability similarly
imposes on Congress a normative assessment of what constitutes a remedy, even
though the question was not clearly necessary to the result in the case.
Judge Fletcher describes Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding injury-in-
fact as tantamount to substantive due process: "For the Court to limit the power of
Congress to create statutory rights enforceable by certain groups of people- to limit,
in other words, the power of Congress to create standing- is to limit the power of
Congress to define and protect against certain kinds of injury that the Court thinks it
improper to protect against." Id. at 233. He has argued that the Constitution would
be best served by scrapping the three-pronged test applied in cases such as Lujan
and Steel Company in favor of a doctrine that recognizes the power of Congress to
confer standing on any persons it wishes, subject only to the limitation that the duty
such persons sue to enforce is a duty that Congress may legitimately create. See id.
at 223-24; see also Christopher J. Sprigman, Comment, Standing on Firmer Ground.
Separation of Powers and Deference to Congressional Findings in the Standing
Analysis, 59 U. C-I. L. REV. 1645, 1646 (1992) (commenting on the de novo review of
congressional findings of redressability and causation by one wing of the D.C.
Circuit).
15. SteelCo., 118S. Ct. at 1016.




A. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
In the wake of the 1984 Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal,
India, Congress passed the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA)17 to make information about
hazardous and toxic chemicals more readily available to the
public.'8 EPCRA requires users of listed chemicals to file annual
forms reporting the use of such chemicals.19 Under its citizen
suit provision, "any person" may bring suit "on his own behalf
against an alleged violator to compel the violator to file the
mandated inventory and toxic chemical release forms.2" The
federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over citizen
suits under EPCRA.21 Like many environmental statutes with
citizen suit provisions,2 2 EPCRA requires a potential plaintiff to
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994).
18. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1238 (1996),
vacated, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-962,
at 281 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3374.
19. EPCRA requires that emergency and hazardous chemical inventory forms be
filed about each chemical for which a material safety data sheet must be kept under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-667 (1994). and
associated regulations. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021(a)(2)(A)(i), 11021(a)(2)(B), 11022(a)(1),
11022(c) (1994). The inventory form must include an estimate of the maximum and
average amounts of such chemicals present during the year and the general location
of such chemicals, and may, at the request of state or local planning committees.
include additional information regarding storage and precise location of chemicals.
See 42 U.S.C. § 11022(d) (1994). EPCRA further requires that toxic chemical release
forms be ified for all chemicals listed in -Toxic Chemicals Subject to Section 313 of
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act," Committee Print
Number 99-169, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, or any
revision of that list made by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 11023(c), (d) (1994). The toxic chemical release form must
include information about the general way in which the chemical is generated or
used, the estimated maximum amount of the chemical present at any time during the
year, the method of waste treatment or disposal, an estimate of the efficiency of such
treatment or disposal, and the total amount of the chemical entering each
environmental medium per year. See 42 U.S.C. § 11023(g)(1) (1994).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (1994).
2 1. "Any action under subsection (a) of this section against an owner or operator
of a facility shall be brought in the district court for the district in which the alleged
violation occurred." Id. § 11046(b)(1). Section 11046(b)(2) allows suit in the district
court for the District of Columbia for suits brought against the EPA.
22. See, e.g., Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act, 15 U.S.C. §
797(b)(5) (1994); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a)
(1994); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6972 (1984); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994); Ocean Thermal Energy
Conversion Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9124(a) (1994).
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give sixty-day notice of violation to the alleged violator, to the
state in which the violation is alleged to have occurred, and to
the Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). 3 No suit may be filed prior to the end of the sixty days,
and no suit may be filed if the Administrator takes civil or
administrative action against the violator.2 "
B. Steel Company in the Lower Courts
In 1995, Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE), a Chicago
environmental organization, gave notice of violation both to The
Steel Company, a steel pickling25 operation, and to state and
federal administrators.26 CBE claimed that The Steel Company
had failed since 1988 to file the reports required by EPCRA.
2 7
The company had indeed not filed the required reports; it did,
however, file them before the end of the sixty-day notice period.28
Once the sixty days had passed and EPA had made clear that it
planned to take no action against The Steel Company, CBE filed
suit in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for
the company's past violations of EPCRA.2 9
23. See42 U.S.C. § 11046(d)(1) (1994).
24. See id. § 11046(d), (e). EPCRA does not provide any exceptions to this
requirement. But cf. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1994) (allowing suits
immediately after notice is given for certain violations of the statute); Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1994) (same); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §
6972(b)(1)(A)(iii) (1994) (same).
25. "[S]teel pickling... is a finishing operation that removes scale and rust from
steel coils .... Steel coils are first unwound and then pulled through a series of
sealed tanks containing diluted hydrochloric acid or 'pickle liquor.'... Over 95
percent of The Steel Company's waste hydrochloric acid and waste rinse water is
either recycled off-site or treated on-site." Brief for the Petitioner, 1997 WL 221790,
at *3-4, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998)
(No. 96-643). Hydrochloric acid is "an extremely hazardous toxic chemical....
Between 1988 and 1995, petitioner.., released 130,618 pounds of hydrochloric acid
into the air." Brief for the Respondent, 1997 WL 348462, at *4, Steel Co. v. Citizens
for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998) (No. 96-643) (citations
omitted).
26. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1009.
27. See id. EPCRA required that initial material safety data sheets be filed in late
1987 or early 1988, see 42 U.S.C. § 11021(d) (1994) (the date varies according to
OSHA's reporting deadlines), and that the initial emergency and hazardous inventory
forms be filed on or before March 1, 1988, see Id. § 11022(a)(2). Thus, The Steel
Company had never fied EPCRA reports.
28. See id.
29. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Company, No. 95-C-4534, 1995 WL
758122, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 1995). In its brief opposing The Steel Company's
motion to dismiss, CBE argued that The Steel Company was in fact in ongoing
violation because its EPCRA filings were deficient. See id. at *5 n.3. The court found
CBE's effort unavailing because the allegations of ongoing violation were not in the
complaint. See id. Throughout the appellate litigation, CBE focused the courts'
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In response, The Steel Company filed a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.3" The Steel Company asserted
that EPCRA does not allow suit for "historical" violations, that
the company's violations were wholly past at the time suit was
filed and thus, that the court lacked jurisdiction.3' CBE replied
that EPCRA's citizen suit provision allows enforcement of all
EPCRA requirements, including the requirement that filings be
submitted by specified dates. Thus, CBE argued, the statute
authorized the suit.
The district court granted The Steel Company's motion to
dismiss. Following the Sixth Circuit's3 holding in Atlantic States
Legal Foundation v. United Musical Instruments U.S.A., Inc.,34 the
district court found that EPCRA does not allow suits for past
violations. 5 Both the United Musical Instruments court and the
district court analogized from the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, in which the
Court found that the language of the Clean Water Act precluded
citizen suits for past violations. 3
The Seventh Circuit reversed. 7 The Court of Appeals found
that the district court had mechanically transferred the
Gwaltney holding to the EPCRA context, assuming without
analysis that, if the Clean Water Act forbids suits for past
violations, then EPCRA does too.3 8  The Seventh Circuit
determined that the proper use of Gwaltney was to apply
attention on the issue of past violations and did not argue that their complaint had
alleged continuing and possible future violations. See Steel Co., 90 F.3d at 1238,
vacated, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998); Brief for the Respondent, Steel Co., 118
S. Ct. at 1003 (1998) (No. 96-643). The United States pointed out in its amicus brief
that CBE had in fact used language in their complaint that could be construed as
alleging ongoing injury. See Brief For The United States As Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 24, Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1003. (1998) (No. 96-643).
30. See Steel Co., 1995 WL 758122, at *2.
31. See id. The Steel Company did not raise the issue of standing until it
petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1009.
32. See Steel Co., 1995 WL 758122, at *2-3.
33. At the time of this case the Sixth Circuit was the only circuit court of appeals
to have addressed the question of past violations under EPCRA. See Steel Co., 90
F.3d at 1238, vacated, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998).
34. 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 1995).
35. See Steel Co., 1995 WL 758122, at *4.
36. 484 U.S. 49, 64 (1987),
37. See Citizens for a Better Env't v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1242 (1996),
vacated, 523 U.S. 83. 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998).
38. See id. at 1242.
1999]
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Gwaltney's "interpretive methodology" to EPCRA's language. 9 In
Gwaltney, the Supreme Court interpreted the Clean Water Act by
closely scrutinizing its text.4° The Court found that Congress'
use of the language "to be in violation"41 precluded suits for past
violations under the Clean Water Act.42  Using the same
"interpretive methodology," the Seventh Circuit read EPCRA's
citizen suit provision to allow citizen suits for past violations: the
phrase "failure to [comply]"43  included past and present
violations.44
The Seventh Circuit thus explicitly rejected the Sixth
Circuit's interpretation of EPCRA. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari on February 24, 1997, to resolve the
conflict.45
II
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In a 9-0 judgment,46 the Supreme Court reversed the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 47 The Court did not, however,
resolve the conflict between the Sixth and the Seventh Circuits
over EPCRA's meaning.48 To interpret the statute would involve
reaching the merits of the case, and a federal court has the duty
to ascertain its jurisdiction over the case before it can address
the merits. Thus, the Court focused on Article III standing, an
39. Id.
40. "It is well settled that the 'starting point for interpreting a statute is the
language of the statute itself.'" Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 56 (quoting Consumer Prod.
Safety Cornm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
41. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994).
42. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 57. Focusing on the verb tenses used in the
Clean Water Act, the Court found that the phrase "to be in violation" required
violations to be ongoing at the time of suit. If violations are wholly past, the violator
cannot not "be in violation," rather, the violator "has been" or "had been" in violation.
See Id.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1)(A) (1994).
44. See Steel Co., 90 F.3d at 1243. Under this analysis, a party who did not fle
required disclosures in 1990 would be liable in 1999 for a "failure to" comply with
EPCRA, though the party may well not "be in violation" as the Clean Water Act
requires. The absence of a present tense verb, the court said, meant that EPCRA
would be interpreted differently from the Clean Water Act.
45. See519 U.S. 1147, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (1997).
46. The Justices presented several different opinions on the reasoning behind the
judgment. Thus, the actual holdings in the majority opinion did not receive
unanimous support. The decision on standing received six votes, see Steel Co., 118
S. Ct. at 1008-21, and the decision on hypothetical jurisdiction received only three
clear votes, see id. at 1021-31 (Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer did not cast
clear votes for the holding on hypothetical jurisdiction). See infra note 89.
47. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1020.
48. See id. at 1009, 1020.
1999] STEEL COMPANY
issue raised by The Steel Company only in its petition for
certiorari.49 Holding that plaintiff CBE lacked standing under
Article III, the Court tabled the question of whether EPCRA
permits suits for past violations. 50
While all nine Justices agreed that CBE's claim should be
dismissed, they disagreed sharply over why it should be
dismissed. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer joined in Justice Scalia's opinion
dismissing CBE's claim for lack of Article III standing."1 Justices
Souter and Ginsburg joined in Justice Stevens' concurrence
recommending that the Court dismiss CBE's claim because
EPCRA conferred no cause of action on the plaintiffs."2
A. Majority Opinion: CBE Lacked Standing to Sue
After a "long front walk" in which the doctrine of
"hypothetical jurisdiction" was found invalid,5 the Court arrived
at the central question: did the plaintiff have standing?4 The
Court applied the familiar three-prong test from Lujan, asking
whether the plaintiff suffered injury-in-fact, whether that injury
was fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct, and whether the
injury could be redressed with a favorable judgment. 55 Focusing
on the redressability analysis, the Court concluded that CBE
49. See id at 1009.
50. See id. at 1020. Under Steel Company, because a plaintiff has no standing
when she sues solely for past violations and only civil penalties are available for
relief, a suit for past violations is now possible only in conjunction with a suit for
ongoing or possible future violations. The question the Court has postponed, then, is
whether a plaintiff who does have standing due to the present and future violations
has the right to claim civil penalties for wholly past violations. Some courts have
interpreted Steel Company to require that the plaintiff have standing for each
category of violations. See San Francisco BayKeeper v. Cargill, No. 96-02161 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 19, 1998) (partial grant of summary judgment).
51. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1008-21. Justice O'Connor also filed a
concurrence emphasizing her belief that in some cases the Court can resolve merits
questions before jurisdictional questions: she was Joined by Justice Kennedy. See id.
at 1020. Justice Breyer Joined the majority as to Parts I and TV and wrote a
concurrence stating that Judicial economy is served by allowing a court to rule on the
merits of a case when its jurisdiction is unclear and resolving the jurisdictional
uncertainty would be much more complex. See id. at 1020-21. For a fuller
explanation of the debate over merits questions and Jurisdictional questions, see infra
notes 118-32 and accompanying text.
52. See id. at 1021-32. Justice Stevens was joined by Justice Souter as to Parts
I, III, and IV, and by Justice Ginsburg as to Part III. See id. at 1021. Justice
Ginsburg also fied her own concurring opinion, echoing Justice Stevens'
condemnation of ruling on constitutional questions unnecessarily. See id. at 1032.
53. See id. at 1012-16; see also infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
54. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1016.
55. See id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
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lacked standing."
First, the Court declined to address the question of injury-in-
fact.57 CBE had alleged that, because EPCRA is an informational
statute and because The Steel Company failed to file the required
information on time, CBE's right and that of its members to
receive timely information had been violated. The Steel
Company's violation of EPCRA allegedly had damaged CBE's
interest in protecting and improving the environment, and
allegedly had harmed the "safety, health, recreational, economic,
aesthetic, and environmental interests" of its members in the
information.-8 The Court, however, did not decide whether being
deprived of timely information required to be disclosed under
EPCRA is a sufficient injury-in-fact to meet the standing test. 9
Instead, Justice Scalia found that, even assuming injury-in-fact
occurred, the plaintiff failed to satisfy the redressability prong of
56. See id. at 1017-20.
57. See id. at 1018.
58. Id. at 1017-18 (citing plaintiffs complaint).
59. See id. at 1018. The Court's language suggests that informational injury
under EPCRA is not sufficient to meet Article III's requirement of injury-in-fact. The
Court has held informational injury sufficient under other statutes, however. A case
decided later in the 1998 term held that the Federal Election Commission's failure to
provide information to a political action committee regarding donors and campaign
expenditures was sufficient injury to satisfy Article III. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S.
11, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 1784-85 (1998). Similarly, in Havens Realty v. Coleman, the
Court found that a plaintiff alleging that she had been denied accurate real estate
information because of her race had standing under Article III to sue for violations of
Section 804 of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994). 455 U.S. 363
(1982). The Court granted standing despite the plaintiffs status as a "tester"- a
person who has no intent of renting or buying property but who visits the real estate
agency to ensure compliance with the Fair Housing Act:
A tester who has been the object of a misrepresentation made unlawful
under § 804(d) has suffered injury in precisely the form the statute was
intended to guard against, and therefore has standing to maintain a claim
for damages under the Act's provisions.
If the facts are as alleged, then [the black tester] has suffered "specific
injury" from the challenged acts of petitioners and the Article III
requirement of injury in fact is satisfied.
Id. at 373-74 (citation omitted); see also Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491
U.S. 440, 449 (1989) (noting that the plaintiffs inability to obtain information subject
to disclosure under the Federal Advisory Committee Act "constitutes a sufficiently
distinct injury to provide standing to sue").
Justice Scalia's statement in Steel Company is thus puzzling. If it suggests
that informational injury under environmental statutes will be treated differently
from similar injuries under civil rights statutes, then Justice Scalia's statement
provides support for Judge Fletcher's argument that standing analysis is akin to




Redressability requires "a likelihood that the requested relief
will redress the alleged injury."6 CBE requested declaratory
relief, costs and attorney fees, civil penalties, and injunctive relief
under EPCRA.62 The Court analyzed each potential remedy in
turn.
The Court quickly disposed of the request for a declaratory
judgment, stating that it was "seemingly worthless to all the
world."' Because no dispute existed over whether a violation of
EPCRA had actually occurred (The Steel Company freely
admitted it had violated EPCRA), no controversy existed for a
declaratory judgment to remedy." Justice Scalia gave similarly
brief treatment to CBE's claim for costs and attorney fees,
stating that "a plaintiff cannot achieve standing to litigate a
substantive issue by bringing suit for the cost of bringing suit."65
The Court discussed CBE's demands for civil penalties and
injunctive relief at greater length. The Court held that civil
penalties could not redress CBE's injury because such penalties
would be paid directly to the U.S. Treasury, not to CBE.66
Though CBE argued for the deterrent effect of civil penalties,
Justice Scalia responded by pointing out that CBE's own
allegations showed no conduct by The Steel Company that civil
penalties would deter. CBE had alleged only past violations.
The Court thus concluded that CBE's only benefit from civil
penalties would be its satisfaction in seeing a wrongdoer pay for
his wrong.6  Such "comfort and joy" or "psychic satisfaction" is
not sufficient redress for any cognizable Article III injury. 68 Such
satisfaction is identical to the "vindication of the rule of law" in
the "undifferentiated public interest" deemed insufficient in
Lujan.
69
60. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 10 18-20. The Court ignores the causation prong
of the standing test altogether.
61. Id. at 1017.
62. See iA. at 1018. EPCRA authorizes the recovery of "costs of litigation
(including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) [by] the prevailing or the
substantially prevailing party." 42 U.S.C. § 11046() (1994).
63. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1018.
64. See id.
65. Id. at 1019. But see infra note 125 and accompanying text.
66. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1018-19.
67. See At; see also iA. at 1019.
68. Id.; see infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text (arguing that this holding,
while it purports to be a holding on redressability, in fact is a holding on injury-in-
fact).
69. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1018 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 577 (1992)).
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The Court also found CBE's claim for injunctive relief
insufficient.7 0 Although injunctive relief normally addresses a
plaintiffs injury directly, CBE alleged only past violations."
Injunctive relief is always prospective.7 2 The Court thus found
that in order for injunctive relief to provide a remedy for its
harm, CBE must have alleged current violations or the
probability of future violations.7 3 Indeed, such alleged injury
could have been remedied by injunctive relief7 4 Even if The Steel
Company had claimed it was in compliance despite the
allegations, CBE could have employed the well-known doctrine
that voluntary cessation does not render a case moot.7 5 Without
such allegations, however, the voluntary cessation argument was
inapplicable. The Court therefore found CBE's failure to allege
current or future violations fatal to its claim of redressabflity.
The Court's main point was that whatever remedy the
plaintiff requests must directly redress the injury alleged: "Relief
that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a
70. See id at 1019-20.




75. See id. at 1019-20. The United States argued as amicus curiae that
plaintiffs' complaint could be construed to allege the possibility of future injury: *The
complaint alleges that '[tihe safety, health, recreational, economic, aesthetic and
environmental interests of [respondent's] members and their right to know about
such releases have been, are being, and will be adversely affected by [petitioner's]
actions in failing to file timely and required reports under EPCRA.'" Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 24, Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at
1003 (1998) (No. 96-643).
Because the complaint alleged ongoing or possible future injury, the United
States argued under the voluntary cessation doctrine that future injury by the
defendant should be presumed. See id. at 28. That doctrine "protects plaintiffs from
defendants who seek to evade sanction by predictable 'protestations of repentance
and reform.'" Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 67 (1987)
(quoting United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952)).
Under the doctrine, the defendant bears an extremely heavy burden to prove that "no
reasonable expectation" exists of repeated wrongs. Id at 66. If the defendant cannot
meet this burden, the case will not be dismissed as moot. See Wi.
The Steel Company Court rejected this argument, construing CBE's
complaint as alleging no ongoing or future injury. See 118 S. Ct. at 1020. CBE
based its brief for the Court on EPCRA's authorization of suit for wholly past
violations and made no argument for continuing or possible future violations. See
Brief for the Respondent, Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1003 (1998) (No. 96-643). Justice
Scalia noted that while it is true that a defendant cannot escape suit over allegations
of ongoing violations simply by stopping his bad activities until the case is declared
moot, the plaintiff must have made those allegations "particular and concrete." Id.
Only when the defendant is allegedly violating the law at the time suit is brought and
stops violating in response to the litigation itself does the voluntary cessation
doctrine apply. See id.
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plaintiff into federal court."16 Because CBE had no redress for its
injuries, it had no Article III standing. The Court therefore did
not reach the question of whether EPCRA authorizes suit for
past violations: EPCRA, Justice Scalia said, would "have to wait
another day."'
B. Concurring Opinion: The Court Needlessly Addressed the
Constitutional Question
The majority and the concurring justices differed primarily in
their characterizations of the question, "Does EPCRA allow
citizen suits for past violations?" In his concurrence, Justice
Stevens defined the question as one of jurisdiction under the
statute."' Such a jurisdictional question is a threshold inquiry,
just as standing is a threshold inquiry. 0 According to Justice
Stevens, the Court could and should have resolved the case by
determining whether EPCRA gives the federal courts jurisdiction
over suits for past violations of EPCRA rather than by assessing
Article III standing; in answering the standing question, the
Court needlessly analyzed a constitutional question.s Justice
Stevens found that EPCRA does not allow suits for wholly past
violations and thus that the federal courts had no jurisdiction
over CBE's suit.8 2 The constitutional question was avoided, and
yet Justice Stevens reached the same result as did the
majority.83
76. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1019.
77. See d at 1020.
78. Id
79. See Id at 102 1. Justice Stevens was joined by Justice Souter as to Parts I,
III, and IV, and by Justice Ginsburg as to Part III. Thus, Justices Souter and
Ginsburg agreed with Justice Stevens that the case should be dismissed based on
the interpretation of EPCRA (Part III) though neither joined Justice Stevens' lengthy
discussion of the majority's standing analysis (Part II).
80. See i at 1021-22.
81. See Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth.,
297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). Ashwcnde's doctrine is
familiar. "[I]f a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a
constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law.
the Court will decide only the latter." 297 U.S. at 347. The doctrine highlights the
intricate interrelation between standing and statutory jurisdiction, an interrelation
that Justice Stevens emphasized in Steel Company. If the plaintiff has no standing,
the Court has no jurisdiction to answer the statutory question. But if the statute
does not confer jurisdiction on the Court, the Court unnecessarily addressed the
constitutional question of standing when it avoided the statutory question. Thus, in
either approach the Court must engage in an act that to some extent involves an
arrogation of power. The question is which approach minimizes that arrogation.
82. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1031-32.
83. See id. at 1021 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens went on to argue
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C. Majority Response: Justice Stevens Would Have the Court Act
Ultra Vires
The majority disagreed with Justice Stevens on virtually
every point. In a discussion Justice Scalia described as a "long
front walk" to the threshold question of standing," the Court
asserted that Justice Stevens was incorrect in describing the
past violations question as one of whether EPCRA conferred
jurisdiction on the federal courts or provided a cause of action.85
According to the Court, Justice Stevens' analysis rested on
whether the elements of a violation of EPCRA had been
established.8" But whether such elements had been established
is a merits question rather than a jurisdictional question.87
Article III requires that, prior to any analysis of the merits, a
court must inquire into its jurisdiction.88 To decide whether
EPCRA allows suit for past violations before the plaintiff has
shown Article III standing is to violate Article 111.89
that the question of whether CBE could sue could be characterized as a question of
whether CBE had stated a cause of action, thus seeming to endorse the practice of
hypothetical jurisdiction. See ic. at 1024. Hypothetical jurisdiction has been used
by the First, Second, Ninth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits over the last decade. This
doctrine allowed a court to decide a merits question before a jurisdictional question if
the merits question was easier to answer, and the same party prevailed on the merits
as would prevail if jurisdiction were to be denied. See id. at 1012. In fact, Justice
Stevens stated that he took no position on the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction.
"The doctrine.., is irrelevant because this case presents us with a choice between
two threshold questions that are intricately interrelated- as there is only a standing
problem if the statute confers jurisdiction over suits for wholly past violations." Id. at
1026-27. The Court did not disagree that statutory standing questions can be
decided before Article Ill standing, or even that a merits question can be decided
before a statutory standing question. See id. at 1013 n.2. Justice Stevens reasoned
that the Court must logically then allow a merits analysis to be given priority over an
Article Ill analysis. See id. at 1025 n. 12. Justice Scalia replied that "broken circles"
appear often in "life and the law," and that allowing a merits question to precede an
Article Ill question would open the federal courts to all comers. Id. at 1013 n.2.
Justice Stevens, however, did not himself argue for answering merits questions
before Article III questions; he merely pointed out that the Court's logic seemed to
require such a result. See id. at 1025 n. 12. Justice Scalia's response thus seems
somewhat disingenuous.
84. Id. at 1016.
85. Seeid.at 1011.
86. See id.
87. See id. According to the Court, Justice Stevens' analysis of whether the
plaintiff had presented a cause of action was even more transparently a merits
question. See id. at 1012.
88. See icl. at 1012, 1016.
89. See id. Justice Scalia took this opportunity to reject outright the doctrine of
hypothetical jurisdiction. "For a court to pronounce upon the meaning or the
constitutionality of a state or federal law when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by
very definition, for a court to act ultra vires." Id. at 1016. Justice Stevens argued that





Steel Company predictably extends the standing doctrine of
Lujan and other standing cases.9 ° Presented with a choice
between a broader or a narrower interpretation of redressability,
many scholars expected the Court to choose the narrower.91
Given CBE's failure to allege ongoing or possible future
violations, the outcome is unsurprising. Steel Company does,
however, reflect the larger turmoil surrounding Article III
standing doctrine. Commentators have pointed out that
standing doctrine is mystifying and even "incoherent."92 Such
incoherence both makes plaintiffs less certain about their
prospects for successful lawsuits and adds unnecessary
argument to cases as parties debate the meaning of the doctrine.
The holding in Steel Company contributes to that incoherency:
the language in the decision is subject to widely varying
interpretations, and many subsequent cases have therefore gone
See id. at 1026. Justice Stevens may have had more votes on this point than did
Justice Scalia. As the Fifth Circuit has pointed out, the holding on hypothetical
jurisdiction does not seem to have received a majority of votes: Justices Breyer,
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg expressed disagreement with an absolute rejection of
hypothetical jurisdiction. Although Justice O'Connor said at the beginning of her
concurring opinion (which Justice Kennedy joined) that she joined the Court's
opinion, she penned an equivocal passage concerning the doctrine of hypothetical
jurisdiction. See infra note 131 and accompanying text. United States v. Texas Tech
Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 287 n.11 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). The Supreme
Court has since described Steel Company as holding that the doctrine of hypothetical
jurisdiction had been rejected. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 119 S. Ct.
1563, 1566-67 (1999) (unanimous opinion); see also, e.g., Axess Int'l, Ltd. v.
Intercargo Ins. Co., 183 F.3d 935, 943-44 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); Fidelity Partners,
Inc. v. First Trust Co., 142 F.3d 560, 565 (2d Cir. 1998) (same); Seabom v. Florida,
143 F.3d 1405, 1407 n.2 (11th Cir. 1998) (Steel Company "squarely rejected" the
doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction); Martin v. Kansas, Nos. 98-3102, 98-3118, 1999
WL 635916 (10th Cir. Aug. 19, 1999) (finding that Steel Company's rejection of the
doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction requires that the state's claim of Eleventh
Amendment immunity be addressed before the court may reach the merits of the
plaintiffs claim). But cf. Parella v. Retirement Bd., 173 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 1999)
(distinguishing Steel Company and finding that answering the Eleventh Amendment
question would mean reaching an unnecessary constitutional question).
90. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 568 (1992); Renne v.
Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1991).
91. See, e.g., Jim Hecker, Citizen Standing to Sue for Past EPCRA Violations,
[1997] 27 Envti. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,561 (suggesting that dicta in Gwaltney,
484 U.S. at 70-71, indicated Court would rule against citizen standing in Steel
Company).
92. Fletcher, supra note 8, at 221 (1988); see also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSITUIONAL LAw 107 (2d ed. 1988); Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981
Term- Foreword Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11-
22 (1982); Fallon, supra note 11; Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, 91
MICH. L. REv. 163, 223 (1992).
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much further than seems warranted in denying standing to
citizen plaintiffs.93
Such interpretation problems may simply represent the
usual evolution of doctrine in a judicial system that relies on
precedent and stare decisis. But the eagerness of some lower
courts to read Steel Company expansively highlights the deeper
problem with the decision. When the Court purports to use
standing doctrine to restrain its own power but actually goes
further than is necessary so that it creates new doctrine, the
Court exceeds its powers and exacerbates rather than defuses
constitutional tension. Steel Company has not only increased
the mystification of standing doctrine but has also undermined
its very purpose.
A. Steel Company is the Predictable Successor to Recent
Standing Cases
The Court has retreated dramatically over the last quarter-
century from the more expansive view of standing presented in
cases such as Flast v. Cohen! and United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP).95  Cases
such as these have focused primarily on narrowing the scope of
cognizable injury-in-fact. The year after SCRAP was decided,
Justice Powell lamented that "the concept of particularized injury
has been dramatically diluted [by SCRAPI."96 In Whitmore v.
Arkansas, the Court described SCRAP as a case whose
interpretation of injury-in-fact "surely went to the outer limit of
the law."97 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the most notable of
recent standing cases, rejected a definition of injury-in-fact that
would have included hypothetical or conjectural injuries. 98
Redressability has played a less prominent role in standing
jurisprudence, having emerged as a separate requirement under
the "case or controversy" doctrine only in the last quarter
century. 9 Those cases that have addressed the plaintiffs claim
for redress have hewn closely to the line established in the
93. See supra note 9 and infra Part III.B. 1. The Court has granted certiorari in
Laidlaw, 119 S. Ct. 1111 (1999), and in the 1999-2000 term should resolve at least
some of the conflicting interpretations of Steel Company.
94. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
95. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
96. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 194 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
97. 495 U.S. 149, 159 (1990).
98. See 504 U.S. at 560 (citing Whltmore, 495 U.S. at 155).
99. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984).
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injury-in-fact cases. Lujan itself contains a plurality opinion
rejecting the plaintiffs claim for Article III standing on
redressability grounds: the chance that the relief requested
would remedy the alleged injury was too remote.10 Renne v.
Geary, decided the year before Lujan, similarly hinted that the
Court would reject claims for remedy that had little promise of
actually redressing the harm claimed by the plaintiff.'01
Accordingly, Steel Company fits comfortably within current
standing doctrine. CBE's claim for standing seems to have had
even less chance of surviving the redressability analysis than
those made by the plaintiffs in Lujan and Renne. In those cases,
the Court found the possibility of redress too remote to support
Article III standing. In Steel Company, the Court found that the
relief requested by CBE had no possibility of redressing the
alleged injury. 102
B. Steel Company Demonstrates the Difficulty the Court Has in
Applying Standing Doctrine to Maintain Separation of Powers
Precisely because it fits well with its much-criticized
predecessors, Steel Company exemplifies the internal
contradictions in standing doctrine. The decision adds to the
general confusion in two respects. First, the Court's assessment
of redressability has met with widely varying interpretations in
the lower courts. Some of these courts have gone out of their
way to deny standing, applying Steel Company to numerous
different environmental statutes and to factual situations that
differ greatly from the one presented in Steel Company. The
variation in the lower courts is due at least in part to the limited
analysis provided in Steel Company. Second, Steel Company
shows that the Court may actually have used standing to take on
power rather than spurn it.
100. See 504 U.S. at 568. In Lujan, the Court found, as a factual matter, that it
was unlikely that an injunction requiring the United States to withdraw its support
from the projects in question would have any effect on the projects or their impact on
the threatened species. See id. at 571 & n.6. Thus the remedy available through the
federal courts would not address plaintiffs' claimed injury. Of course, the Lujan
Court had already found that injury insufficient to satisfy Article III. See id. at 564-
67.
101. 501 U.S. 312, 319 (1991) (arguing that a separate California statute, whose
constitutionality was not being litigated, may prevent relief of plaintiffs alleged injury
even if the challenged statute was struck down by the Court).
102. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1018-20; see also infra Part III.B.1.
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1. Steel Company's Holding Provides Insufficient Guidance to
the Lower Courts
Narrowly read, Steel Company is a reasonable decision. CBE
claimed remedies, such as declaratory relief, that were
unwarranted given the facts of the case."' The outcome in Steel
Company was reasonable. It is the analysis leading to that
outcome that is problematic. The Court understandably gave
only brief attention to the claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief and for attorney fees; the Court's brief analysis of the
claims for civil penalties, however, was insufficient.
The Court ultimately dismissed CBE's complaint because the
civil penalties were not payable to CBE but to the U.S.
Treasury." The Court noted that CBE could therefore receive
only "psychic satisfaction" from the vindication of the rule of law,
from the knowledge that the Treasury gets paid, or from the
punishment of the violator.'05 "[Pisychic satisfaction is not an
acceptable Article III remedy because it does not redress a
cognizable Article III injury.""°6
But to say civil penalties provide only psychic satisfaction
does not explain in concrete terms why civil penalties cannot
redress the claim made by CBE- that the organization and its
members were harmed by The Steel Company's failure to file its
EPCRA reports on time. 107 Instead, the Court restated its well-
103. Declaratory relief, for example, is obviously unnecessary when the defendant
admits its violation. See icL at 1018.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 1019.
106. Id.
107. One very common argument that civil penalties do redress a citizen plaintiffs
injury is that the penalties deter future violations, either by the same defendant
(specific deterrence) or by other potential defendants (general deterrence). Justice
Stevens referred to this argument in his concurrence, see Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at
1029, and Justice Scalia purported to address it in the general discussion of civil
penalties, see id. at 1018. Arguably, CBE had no claim to specific deterrence
because It had not alleged that The Steel Company was continuing to violate or would
in the future violate EPCRA. As to general deterrence, monetary penalties have a
well-known deterrent effect; the question is whether deterring other potential
violators remedies CBE's alleged injury. Because CBE framed its injury solely in
terms of the harm caused by The Steel Company, CBE could not coherently claim
that general deterrence would address that harm. If, however, a plaintiff wishing to
sue solely for past violations had alleged as part of his injury the fear that other
companies would imitate the defendant, general deterrence would address this injury
and would satisfy the redressability component of Article Il. Such a harm would
probably not satisfy the injury-in-fact component, however. See, e.g.. City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108 (1983).
At least one other possible connection exists between a particular injury and
a civil penalties remedy. Seeing a wrongdoer pay penalties for one's own particular
injury seems a sharply different kind of satisfaction than the generalized feeling of
STEEL COMPANY
known position that a citizen's interest in the vindication of the
rule of law is not cognizable under Article 11.l°8 One can easily
imagine arguments that the Court would have made in
demonstrating the inability of CBE to gain redress with civil
penalties: because CBE did not allege possible future violations
by The Steel Company or any other facility obligated to file
reports under EPCRA, civil penalties can deter no one. The
problem is that the Court made no such argument.
In doing so, the Court created numerous problems for the
lower courts. Because the Court did not make clear why civil
penalties failed to address CBE's claimed injury, the lower courts
have little guidance as to whether the facts of the cases before
them require the same outcome. In Friends of the Earth v.
Laidlaw, the Fourth Circuit denied civil penalties under the
Clean Water Act, reasoning that Steel Company forbade them."
The court stated that, because the court below had denied
injunctive and declaratory relief, and the plaintiff had failed to
appeal those rulings, the remaining appeal of the amount of the
civil penalties had been mooted under Steel Company: the'
plaintiff could no longer obtain relief.110 The court reached this
conclusion despite the plaintiffs proof that the defendant's
violations were ongoing at the time the suit was filed and despite
the very different statutory context."' The district courts have
made similar rulings." 2  Such rulings arguably have arisen
because the Steel Company decision does not sufficiently specify
vindication in the rule of law to which the Court pointed. Whether such satisfaction
is cognizable under Article III is a different question than the one the Court
answered. By failing to address this possibility, the Court may be avoiding an inquiry
into the psychology of retribution, but it already makes that inquiry in determining
that civil penalties can only provide a "psychic satisfaction" of seeing right done.
108. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754-55 (1984); Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
482-83 (1982).
109. 149 F.3d 303, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1111 (1999).
110. See id.
111. See id. at 308.
112. See, e.g., Dubois v. USDA, 20 F. Supp. 2d 263, 266-67 (D.N.H. 1998)
(applying Steel Company and Laidlaw, and finding that the grant of an injunction
earlier in the ongoing Clean Water Act litigation mooted the plaintiffs' claim for civil
penalties because the plaintiffs had not challenged the efficacy of the injunction and
thus had no claim that civil penalties were necessary to deter future violations). The
Dubois argument implies that one can never obtain civil penalties for specific
deterrence: if the court enjoins the behavior, no deterrence is needed, and if the court
feels an injunction is unwarranted, civil penalties would probably be unwarranted
too. But cf. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Southwest Marine, 28 F. Supp. 2d
584, 586 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (finding Steel Company inapplicable to cases involving




which aspects of CBE's factual situation led to the conclusion
that CBE lacked standing to sue.
Also troubling is the possibility that Steel Company aids in
conflating the elements of the standing test,"3 thus inviting
further confusion in standing analysis and increasing
uncertainty among prospective plaintiffs as to their ability to
survive a standing challenge. The Court's rejection of civil
penalties as a remedy rests ultimately on its rejection of
generalized injury as a cognizable Article III injury, not on a
careful analysis of why civil penalties fail to address the
particularized injuries claimed by plaintiffs. Thus, Steel
Company can be read as a sub rosa assessment that the
particularized injury claimed by the plaintiffs amounted to
nothing more than the kind of generalized injury the Court has
rejected in the past."4
2. Steel Company Fails to Satisfy Its Professed Goal of
Maintaining the Separation of Powers
As noted above, the Steel Company opinion has enabled
some lower courts to exercise extensive power to deny standing
to citizen suit plaintiffs. But more troublesome is the way in
which Steel Company itself reveals an inappropriate exercise of
judicial power. In choosing to answer the constitutional
question of standing, the Court went further than it needed to
resolve the controversy before it and thus undermined the very
principles it meant to uphold.
The crux of the distinction appears in the Justices'
disagreement over the status of the question, "Does EPCRA allow
suit for past violations?"'1 5  The majority characterized this
question as a merits question that may only be answered if the
113. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984) (noting that the
redressability and causation prongs "were initially articulated by this Court as 'two
facets of a single causation requirement'"). Richard Pierce notes the tendency of the
federal courts to conflate the prongs of the standing test, especially the causation and
redressability prongs. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:
Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170 (1993)
(describing two prongs of standing analysis as "functionally equivalent*). It is telling
that the definitive casebook on the federal courts treats both causation and
redressability in a single section without specifying in many of the case summaries
which prong led to the outcome. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART &
WEcHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 145-51 (4th ed. 1996).
114. This portion of the discussion owes much to conversations with Michael
Wall.
115. As discussed above, see supra Part I.B. this question- not the standing
question- was the question addressed in the opinions below.
[Vol. 26:709
STEEL COMPANY
court has proper jurisdiction. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Souter, characterized the question as a jurisdictional question so
"intricately interrelated" with the question of standing that either
might be answered first.I" Justice Stevens' concurrence invoked
the Ashwander doctrine, which requires avoiding constitutional
questions when possible, to support answering the statutory
question first.
1 17
Both the majority and the concurrence relied on doctrines
that at bottom ensure the maintenance of constitutional
boundaries between the branches. But the majority and
concurrence took contradictory approaches to the question
presented in Steel Company. A closer examination of the
implications of Steel Company shows that Justice Stevens has
the better argument. Rather than justifying the standing
analysis made by the majority in Steel Company, the separation
of powers maxim argues for answering the statutory question
first.
First, the majority took several steps that technically violate
the very principles that Steel Company is meant to uphold.
Justice Stevens pointed out that the discussion of hypothetical
jurisdiction addresses a question not properly before the
Court.118 If Article III limits the Court's power by requiring that
the parties are adverse enough to "sharpenl the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions,""1 the Court should not
have addressed the hypothetical jurisdiction question at all: it
was not briefed by the parties, and thus the Court did not have
the benefit of opposing advocates to clarify the issues. 20
Second, the majority criticized Justice Stevens' analysis for
its look to the text of the statute to determine whether it provides
for suits for past violations. 2 ' Justice Scalia noted that to
interpret the statute is to rule on the merits, and the Court
therefore may not look at the text of the statute until the plaintiff
116. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1027. Justice Ginsburg did not join the part of
Justice Stevens' opinion using the phrase "intricately interrelated." She nevertheless
concurred in resolving the case by dismissing under the statute.
117. Seeicl. at 1021.
118. See id. at 1026-27.
119. Id. at 1025-26 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
120. See id. at 1026. The Court can of course always raise the question of its own
jurisdiction sua sponte, but to raise that question in this case would require only the
standing or statutory jurisdiction analysis. Justice Stevens argued that the Court
should not have overruled the First and Ninth Circuits' doctrine of hypothetical




has demonstrated standing. 22
But as Justice Stevens pointed out,'23 the Court itself looked
to the text of EPCRA to determine what redress is available to
CBE.124 Responding to Justice Stevens' criticism, Justice Scalia
justified the Court's inquiry into the statute by saying "it involves
us in a construction of the statute only to the extent of rejecting
as frivolous the contention that costs incurred for respondent's
own purposes, not in preparation for litigation (and hence
sufficient to support Article III standing) are nonetheless 'costs of
litigation' under the statute."'25
No matter how reasonable the Court's rejection of CBE's
claim for attorney fees, the Court's move to the text of the statute
is problematic. If the determination of redressability requires a
look at the text of the statute, even if only a limited look, the
difference (on which Justice Scalia relied so heavily) between the
standing analysis and the statutory analysis shrinks. As Justice
Stevens correctly stated, the Court was actually faced with "a
choice between two threshold questions that are intricately
interrelated" 126 rather than one merits question and one non-
merits question. If the Court must look at the statute in either
case,'27 the Court cannot so easily dismiss Justice Stevens'
approach as an illegitimate look to the merits. Something else is
needed to guide the choice.
Separation of powers does in fact provide the guidance.
Even though both the Ashwander and standing doctrines rest on
separation of powers concerns, a closer look demonstrates that
in Steel Company, the Ashwander analysis would have been the
better one. The Court's standing analysis actually amounted to
advice to Congress about how to write statutes. When the Court
found that civil penalties could not redress CBE's injury, the
122. See id. at 1016.
123. See i. at 1027 n.16.
124. See id. at 1019.
125. Id. at 1019 n.9. Justice Scalia does not explain how costs incurred in
preparation for litigation are sufficient to support Article III standing in the absence
of some independent and judicially cognizable injury. Without such injury, a plaintiff
who sues based on her injury due to costs incurred in preparing to sue would seem
to be "bringing suit for the costs of bringing suit." Id. at 1019.
126. Id. at 1027.
127. One could argue that the Court did not look at the statute at all in its crucial
determination that civil penalties cannot redress CBE's injury. Admittedly, the
disagreement between Justices Stevens and Scalia over peeking at the statute
focuses on the attorney fees provision of EPCRA and does not involve the other
claims for redress made by CBE. But the very reasons Justice Scalia used to defend
his brief peek at EPCRA's Section 326(0 were just as useful to Justice Stevens in his
brief peek at Sections 326(a), (d), and (c).
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Court actually determined whether Congress properly structured
EPCRA's citizen suit provision under Article III.128
This question need be reached, however, only if EPCRA
actually allows suit for wholly past violations; if Congress did not
intend for such suits to occur, it is immaterial whether civil
penalties redress a claim for wholly past violations. When the
Court nevertheless reached the redressability question, it
essentially issued an advisory opinion. It told Congress that if it
should decide to pass a statute allowing suit for wholly past
violations, 29 then civil penalties are insufficient under Article III
to provide citizen standing.
Steel Company therefore presents a paradox. Both the
standing question and the statutory question require the Court
to go beyond its allotted power to resolve the case. The statutory
question, the majority argued, should not be answered unless
the plaintiff has standing. The standing question, Justice
Stevens argued, should not be answered unless Congress
intended for citizens to be able to sue for wholly past violations;
that is, constitutional questions should be avoided where
possible.
Both the majority and concurring opinions rest ultimately on
128. It may be that any time the Court reaches a redressability question, it
necessarily must assess Congress' success or failure in staying within Article III. One
can attempt to hypothesize a situation where the plaintiffs claim fails for lack of
redressability. For example, a plaintiff may sue for injunctive relief against water
pollution when she has moved away from the river into which the pollution flows.
But such hypotheticals usually are best recast as questions about injury-in-fact (if
she has moved away from the river, she has no concrete and particular injury from
the pollution).
129. The Clean Air Act was amended in 1990 to provide suit for repeated past
violations. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (1994). The Eastern District of Pennsylvania
recently applied Steel Company to Section 7604(a)(1):
While the CAA concept of past violations is seemingly at tension with the
constitutional standing requirement in Steel, we find that the two concepts
can be reconciled where past violations may meet the redressability
requirement of standing only if they have the possibility of being repeated in
the future. In other words, a plaintiff may assert random past violations of
the CAA and satisfy the redressability requirement by a presumption that
there is a potential ongoing compliance problem or a possibility that such
violations may be repeated.
While Defendants admittedly violated the terms of their federal [Prevention
of Significant Deterioration] permit with respect to [certain] limitations in
the past, any future violations of this permit are impossible because it is
rescinded.
Local Envtl. Awareness Dev. Group v. Exide Battery Corp., No. CIV. 96-3030, 1999
WL 124473, at *"15 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 1999).
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a concern to restrain the Court's power. Once that becomes
clear, the paradox becomes less paradoxical. The choice is not
between addressing a forbidden merits question (and therefore
acting ultra vires) and addressing a straightforward jurisdictional
question. The choice is between two jurisdictional questions that
are "intricately interrelated."
130
More members of the Steel Company Court recognized this
than is at first apparent. Justice O'Connor wrote separately to
emphasize that "the Court's opinion should not be read as
cataloging an exhaustive list of circumstances under which
federal courts may exercise judgment in 'reserv[ing] difficult
questions of... jurisdiction when the case alternatively could be
resolved on the merits in favor of the same party.'"13" ' She was
joined by Justice Kennedy. Justice Breyer similarly wrote
separately, stating
I further agree that federal courts often and typically should
decide standing questions at the outset of a case. That order
of decision (first jurisdiction then the merits) helps better to
restrict the use of the federal courts to those adversarial
disputes that Article III defines as the federal judiciary's
business. But my qualifying words "often" and "typically" are
important. The Constitution, in my view, does not require us
to replace those words with the word "always." The
Constitution does not impose a rigid judicial "order of
operations," when doing so would cause serious practical
problems. 1
32
These statements recognize that standing doctrine is the
Court's interpretation of the "case or controversy" clause, not
immutable constitutional doctrine. The Court should assess
standing when standing doctrine furthers the purposes of the
clause, including the constraints it applies to the exercise of
judicial power. But when that assessment leads the Court to
make an advisory opinion on a constitutional question, the Court
should instead attempt to resolve the case on other grounds.
Because it fails to do this, Steel Company has troublesome
implications for subsequent Article III issues.
C. Practical Implications of Steel Company
Steel Company has been expansively interpreted in the
months since the decision was released, but that expansive
130. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1027 (Stevens, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 1020 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
132. Id. at 1020-21.
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interpretation is incorrect. Steel Company does, of course,
foreclose almost all citizen enforcement for wholly past EPCRA
violations (that is, citizen suits where no allegations of
continuing or possible future injury has been made).133  This
particular aspect of Steel Company raises concerns about federal
regulation of the environment. Because EPA's limited resources
make government enforcement improbable, Steel Company gives
industry little incentive to file the inventory and release forms
required by EPCRA.t34
Moreover, Steel Company may make enforcement of other
environmental laws more difficult, not simply because its
standing analysis will be transferred to other statutory contexts,
but also because EPCRA provides information useful in
implementing other environmental statutes. For example, a
community informed through EPCRA about toxic chemicals at a
particular facility may push for changes in the facility's operation
that reduce toxic chemicals that must be dealt with under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,1
35 the Clean Air Act, 36
or the Clean Water Act.
137
Steel Company does not, however, foreclose all citizen suits
for civil penalties under EPCRA or other statutes. The text of
Steel Company does not justify the interpretations given in
subsequent cases such as Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw,.1 s as
133. One can imagine a factual situation where a company owns several chemical
facilities in the same area, and thus a suit for past violations under EPCRA would
survive the redressability analysis with an argument for specific deterrence. Most
other EPCRA suits for wholly past violations (and with no allegations of ongoing or
possible future violations) would be dismissed for lack of standing under a Steel
Company analysis.
134. While some companies may still file the forms in the interest of public
relations, others may choose not to file for precisely the same reason- deciding that
the future cost of a citizen suit that can be dismissed for lack of standing is less than
the present cost of an alarmed community. A company can fall to comply, receive the
sixty-day notice letter, and then fie the forms; if the person or group filing the citizen
suit then tries to go ahead with the lawsuit, the company can move to dismiss for
lack of standing. Jim Hecker has argued that this incentive structure may also lead
to greater toxics releases, because the public filing of inventories may generate
pressure on companies to reduce and/or recycle their toxic materials. See Hecker,
supra note 91. A firm that does not fie does not experience that pressure.
As discussed below, see infra Part III.A, this situation can be remedied
simply by alleging ongoing or possible future violations. Given the bad faith
demonstrated by a company's deliberate failure to file, allegations of possible future
violations should be easy to make. After all, The Steel Company apparently failed to
fie its EPCRA reports simply because it had no knowledge of the requirement.
135. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939e (1994).
136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7671q (1994).
137. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
138. 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1111 (1999).
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other lower courts have recognized.' 39  The Court granted
certiorari in Laidlaw in March 1999 to resolve the confusion in
the lower courts. 40 Whether the Court expands or narrows the
reach of Steel Company remains to be seen. In the meantime,
plaintiffs bringing citizen suits now know to expect Steel
Company arguments under any environmental citizen suit
provision, and thus have taken steps to make the appropriate
allegations in their complaints to obviate such arguments.'
4'
The remainder of this Casenote reviews some of the steps
recommended by the environmental plaintiffs' bar.
1. If Possible, Allege Ongoing Violations or the Possibility of
Future Violations
Whether or not one agrees with the Court's reasoning in
Steel Company, lower courts will certainly apply it to dismiss
suits for wholly past violations under EPCRA. Steel Company
therefore removes much of the incentive defendants might have
had to settle lawsuits for wholly past violations of EPCRA.
Significantly, Steel Company denies standing only to the
plaintiff who sues solely for past violations of EPCRA.' 42  A
plaintiff alleging ongoing violations or possible future violations
can satisfy the redressability standard outlined in Steel
Company. Justice Scalia stated in dicta that "if respondent had
alleged a continuing violation or the imminence of a future
violation, the injunctive relief requested would remedy that
alleged harm."4 3 Thus an environmental plaintiff may survive
the standing test by alleging ongoing or future injury.
Such allegations may be insufficient to maintain a claim for
civil penalties, however. Some cases subsequent to Steel
Company have held that, even with allegations of ongoing
violations, a citizen suit plaintiff has no standing for civil
penalties. 144 In Dubois v. USDA, the court found that because
139. See San Francisco BayKeeper v. Vallejo Sanitation and Flood Control Dist.,
No. CIV-S-96-1554, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2211 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 1999); Local
Envtl. Awareness Dev. Group v. Exide Corp, No. CIV-96-3030, 1999 WL 124473
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 1999); NRDC v. Southwest Marine, 28 F. Supp. 2d 584 (S.D. Cal.
1998).
140. See 119 S. Ct. 111 (1999).
141. Practitioners have exchanged strategies for opposing Steel Company-driven
motions to dismiss at conferences such as the Public Interest Environmental Law
Conference at the University of Oregon Law School, March 3-5, 1999.
142. See 118 S. Ct. at 1019.
143. Id.
144. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 149 F.3d 303, 305 (4th Cir. 1998)
(defendant found to be in substantial compliance; denial of injunctive and declaratory
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the plaintiffs had succeeded in obtaining injunctive relief to stop
the defendant's continuing violations of the Clean Water Act, the
claim for civil penalties was moot: with no continuing violations
to deter, civil penalties could serve only to satisfy the plaintiffs'
general interest in seeing those who violate the law punished.
45
The environmental plaintiff should try to forestall this outcome
by emphasizing the remedy provided by civil penalties. The
legislative histories of most of the environmental statutes make
clear that Congress incorporated civil penalties for their
deterrent effects.146 Because the Court in Steel Company does
not clarify whether civil penalties would redress an injury caused
by ongoing or future violations, the environmental plaintiff
should turn to previous cases, such as Gwaltney of Smithfield v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, where the Supreme Court upheld
the award of civil penalties in citizen suits. 1
47
2. Distinguish EPCRA from Other Environmental Statutes
Environmental plaintiffs must pay careful attention to the
effect of Steel Company on suits under other statutes. Most
environmental statutes have citizen suit provisions 48 similar to
that in EPCRA, which allows civil penalties to be paid only to the
U.S. Treasury. 
49
The Clean Air Act appeared to have the best chance of
withstanding a Steel Company attack even for a suit for wholly
past violations. In the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments,
Congress made clear that it intended the Act to allow suits for
past violations, as long as those violations are repeated (a single
past violation is insufficient). 50 Congress also authorized judges
to allocate up to $100,000 of any civil penalties awarded in a
citizen suit to be used for beneficial mitigation projects to remedy
relief not appealed); Dubois v. USDA, 20 F. Supp. 2d 263 (D.N.H. 1998); San
Francisco BayKeeper v. Cargill. No. 96-02161 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 1998) (partial grant
of summary judgment).
145. See 20 F. Supp. 2d at 267 n.3.
146. See, e.g., H.R_ CONF. REP. No. 1004, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1986); S. REP.
No. 50, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1985) (stating that amending the Clean Water Act
to increase civil penalties for violations would enhance the deterrent effect of the
penalties); S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385 (same in context of Clean Air Act).
147. See 484 U.S. 49, 64 (1987).
148. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994); Solid Waste Disposal
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(g) (1994).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c) (1994).
150. See id. § 7604(a)(1).
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environmental damage.1 5 1  To the extent that such projects
benefit the plaintiffs in the citizen suit, those plaintiffs receive
direct redress for their past injuries. Thus, a Clean Air Act citizen
suit requesting such relief should survive a standing challenge,
even if only past violations are alleged.
This issue had been addressed in three district court
decisions by the end of September 1999. Two of the courts
found the Clean Air Act's beneficial mitigation provision
insufficient to overcome a Steel Company challenge to
redressability. 152 One court found sufficient possibility that the
plaintiffs would receive some relief through a beneficial
mitigation project that the plaintiffs satisfied Article III's
redressability requirement. 15
If Steel Company means that plaintiffs have standing to sue
only to the extent that they can obtain personal redress,
however, even the Clean Air Act's beneficial mitigation provision
may prove a meager protection, allowing plaintiffs standing only
for as many past violations as give rise to $100,000 in penalties.
Even allegations of continuing or possible future violations may
be insufficient. As discussed above, some courts have applied
Steel Company to dismiss plaintiffs who alleged continuing or
possible future injury."s A citizen suit plaintiff should therefore
do whatever is possible to distinguish EPCRA from other
environmental statutes and to emphasize the decisions that have
narrowly construed Steel Company.1
55
CONCLUSION
Steel Company perpetuates the confusion caused by
standing doctrine over the last twenty-five years.15 6  Ironically,
151. See id. § 7604(g)(2).
152. See Anderson v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 863, 871 n.10 (D.
Kan. 1999) (stating, without explanation, that a beneficial mitigation project was
insufficient under Steel Company); Lead Envtl. Awareness Dev. Group v. Exide Corp.,
No. CIV-96-3030, 1999 WL 124473 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 1999) (Van Antwerpen, J.)
(finding the beneficial mitigation under the Clean Air Act too generalized to redress
plaintiffs' injuries).
153. See United States v. LTV Steel Co., 187 F.R.D. 522, 526 (E.D. Pa 1998)
(Cindrich, J.) ('The citizens suit provision of the CAA... provides for the
establishment of a beneficial mitigation fund which could be structured to provide
some measure of redress to [Group Against Smog and Pollution] members living or
working in or near Hazelwood for LTWs alleged violations.").
154. See, e.g., San Francisco BayKeeper v. Cargill, No. 96-02161 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
19, 1998). In granting certiorari in Laidlaw, the Supreme Court may well intend to
clarify that Steel Company does not extend as far as the Fourth Circuit and other
courts have extended it.
155. See supra note 9.
156. See Fletcher, supra note 8, at 221.
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Steel Company also expands the reach of the Court in the name
of limiting that reach. This Casenote has demonstrated that the
majority's standing analysis is susceptible to the same
separation of powers criticisms that the majority makes of
Justice Stevens' concurrence. Justice Stevens more convincingly
analyzed the Court's role in the constitutional structure by
recognizing the complex interaction between statutory grants of
jurisdiction and Article III constraints on the Court. This
approach better ensures that the Court does not "make(] a sword
out of [an Article III] shield"5 7 and truly maintains the separation
of powers intended by the Constitution.
157. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1020.
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